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Abstract 
Post-merger appraisal rights have been the focus of heated controversy within mergers and acquisitions 
circles in recent years. Traditionally perceived as an arcane and cabalistic proceeding, the appraisal action 
has recently come to occupy center stage through the ascendancy of appraisal arbitrage—whereby 
investors purchase target-company shares shortly after an announcement principally to pursue appraisal. 
Such strategies became more feasible and profitable a decade ago, on the heels of two seemingly 
technocratic reforms in Delaware: (i) the statutory codification of prejudgment interest, pegging a 
presumptive rate at five percent above the federal discount rate; and (ii) the Transkaryotic opinion, which 
effectively sanctified appraisal claims trading. Several commentators have decried appraisal arbitrage as 
visiting unnecessary risks and costs on deal certainty and pricing, advancing the position that it reduces / 
destroys target shareholder value. This paper interrogates such claims both theoretically and empirically, 
testing the predictions of an auction-design model that assesses appraisal’s price and welfare effects. We 
find—consistent with comparative statics of our model—that the appraisal-liberalizing events of 2007 were 
associated with a significant increase in deal premia, as the enhanced credibility of appraisal had the effect 
of raising the de facto “reserve price” associated with M&A auctions. We further find little evidence that 
liberalized appraisal rights stifled the incidence of appraisal eligible deals.  When interpreted through the 
lens of our auction-design model, our findings suggest that target-company shareholders likely benefited 
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I.  Introduction 
In mergers and acquisitions (M&A) law, the outcome of deal litigation often hinges 
critically on the content and discharge of the fiduciary duties owed by target-company officers, 
directors and dominant shareholders. This obsession is no doubt warranted: Fiduciary conflicts can 
prove to be most consequential at the Rubicon of a sale—often the endgame for target-company 
shareholders. Accordingly, for the good part of the last half-century, Delaware courts have singled 
out such special circumstances for special attention in developing the state’s fiduciary common 
law, imposing heightened scrutiny on decision making in the M&A context, and spotlighting “the 
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of 
the corporation and its shareholders.” (Unocal v. Mesa (1985); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
(1986)). The topic is easily one of the most celebrated and written-about areas of company law. 
Far from the limelight of fiduciary duties, a vestigial fossil from a bygone M&A era has 
reclusively lurked, awaiting its Norma Desmond close-up1: The statutory appraisal right. The 
appraisal proceeding affords target-company shareholders an option of eschewing the terms of an 
acquisition in favor of receiving a judicially determined cash valuation for their shares.  All states 
have long provided this statutory option in some form or another for many—but not all—
transactions. Its roots trace to the mid-19th century, and it first became available in Delaware in 
its modern form in the early part of the 20th century (Eisenberg 1976). 
In appraisal-eligible cases,2 dissenting shareholders hold a potentially powerful tool to 
counter deal terms they believe to be inadequate or under-compensatory. When sought by an 
                                               
1 Sunset Boulevard, Closing Scene E-47 (1950) (https://youtu.be/jMTT0LW0M_Y). 
2 Eligible public-target transactions under the Delaware statute are generally limited to statutory mergers that involve 
either a mandatory cash component or a squeeze out of minority shareholders.  In addition, shareholders seeking the 
remedy must “perfect” their eligibility in several ways (including not voting their shares in favor of the transaction). 
See 8 Del. C. § 262(h). 
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eligible shareholder, appraisal obliges a court to “determine the fair value of the shares” of the 
target corporation, “tak[ing] into account all relevant factors” and with no explicit assignment of 
the burden of proof. 8 Del. C. § 262(h).  Beginning in the early 1980s, this task of fair valuation in 
appraisal began increasingly to be based on modern tools of financial valuation, including 
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and comparable company benchmarking. Modern appraisal 
cases invariably entail prolix valuation reports by competing experts whose fair value estimates 
can differ multifold. By most accounts, non-financially-trained judges find such procedures 
challenging at best (Talley 2017; Choi & Talley 2017). 
It was not until 2007, however, that appraisal rights finally received their Desmondian due, 
courtesy of two significant legal events that afforded the statutory proceeding a spotlight of its 
own.  First, in August of 2007, § 262(h) of the Delaware code was amended to award presumptive 
pre-judgment interest in appraisal proceedings pegged at the Federal Reserve discount rate plus 
five percent (5%), compounded quarterly.  (Although the statute allows the court to impose a 
different rate in exercising its equitable discretion, the overwhelming practice since the amendment 
has been simply to award the statutory spread.)  Coming in an era of notable narrowing in spreads 
and reduced opportunity cost of capital, the statutory pre-judgment rate typically rendered an 
investment in a post-closing appraisal action against a credit-worthy acquirer to be among the 
highest yielding investments available (Jetly & Ji 2016). 
Second, in May of 2007 an important Delaware case substantially liberalized eligibility of 
a shareholder both to aggregate claims through share purchases and to perfect a right to appraisal.  
In In re: Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. (2007), Chancellor William Chandler held 
that a beneficial owner of stock in a public target who buys after the “record date” of merger (a) 
remains eligible to assert appraisal rights; and (b) need not prove continued eligibility by tracing 
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how the votes that were associated with her newly acquired shares were cast in the shareholder 
proxy election.3  In effect, Transkaryotic sanctified and legitimized a potential market for claims 
trading and aggregation in appraisal actions. 
Although both the statutory amendment to § 262 and the Transkaryotic opinion were 
motivated almost solely by pragmatic considerations, they (perhaps unwittingly) opened the door 
to an arbitrage opportunity for outside hedge funds: For it now became possible to accumulate 
shares in the target company after an announced merger, perfect appraisal rights, and put forward 
a sophisticated expert to challenge the merger consideration, possibly obtaining an award in excess 
of the merger consideration.  And, even if the award fell short of the merger consideration, it would 
accrue interest at the statutory compounded rate, often far outpacing the risk-adjusted return on the 
deal consideration itself.  
The growth in “appraisal arbitrage” that ensued in the years since has attracted much 
attention, and contending with appraisal risk has (purportedly) become a critical consideration in 
designing, pricing, and even pursuing an otherwise eligible transaction.  The rationale usually 
advanced by critics is that appraisal risk hurts target shareholders by depressing deal prices and 
frequencies, and that reintroducing (pre-2007-like) limits on the appraisal right would ultimately 
inure to shareholders’ ex ante benefit. (See Hamermesh & Wachter 2017, reviewing literature).  
Resistance to appraisal arbitrage has also attracted judicial attention, culminating in two recent 
Delaware Supreme Court opinions that have substantially undercut the value of seeking appraisal 
by inducing trial courts to place greater emphasis on the deal price and pre-deal market price 
(potentially less relative emphasis on DCF) when valuing shares. (Dell v. Magnetar (2017); DFC 
Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners (2017)). 
                                               
3 Under the formal rules of the statute (8 Del. C. § 262(h)), if a share were voted in favor of a proposed deal, that 
share would lose eligibility to seek post-closing appraisal rights. 
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This paper considers the question of whether the 2007 reforms had the negative 
repercussions that critics lament, both from theoretical and empirical perspectives.  Theoretically, 
we extend the auction-design framework developed in Choi & Talley (2017) to derive a series of 
comparative statics related to observable factors concerning M&A transactions and target 
shareholder welfare.  Using this model, we demonstrate that a credible threat of an appraisal action 
can sometimes constitute a valuable vehicle for augmenting shareholder value, whereby the specter 
of later appraisal value acts as a credible type of “reserve price” in a company auction.  So long as 
the anticipated appraisal value remains (weakly) below the expected-revenue-maximizing reserve 
price in a company auction (and the appraisal statute all but compels it to do so), appraisal always 
weakly benefits shareholders in the aggregate.  At the same time, the gains from appraisal need 
not be distributed evenly, and there may exist equilibria where appraisal’s benefits inure solely to 
shareholders who dissent strategically from otherwise good deals in order to seek additional 
consideration through appraisal (giving the shorter end of the stick to shareholders who must carry 
the vote and cannot seek appraisal). And, irrespective of distributional concerns, if the anticipated 
appraisal right grows “too large” it can reduce aggregate target shareholder welfare (by imposing 
a prohibitive reserve price on an auction).  More significantly, our model delivers testable 
empirical predictions relating to how “shocks” to the appraisal remedy affect expected shareholder 
value. In particular, we show that under plausible assumptions as to the status quo ante, a 
liberalizing shock to appraisal will lead to enhanced target shareholder welfare if it is accompanied 
by an increase in expected merger premia for appraisal eligible deals.4  
We then test this (and related) predictions empirically using the 2007 reforms as an 
appraisal-liberalizing shock. First, we demonstrate (consistent with our model) that deal premia 
                                               
4 Formally, this condition also requires the assumption that under the status quo ante, courts faithfully execute their 
statutory mandate (even approximately) to award fair value exclusive of deal synergies. See Corollary 4, infra. 
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are discernibly higher in appraisal eligible transactions (even when one accounts for the tax status 
of the deal).  Second, we use a difference-in-differences specification to consider the combined 
effects of the 2007 shocks (Transkaryotic and the amendment of DGCL 262(h)) on deal premia 
for appraisal-eligible acquisition (using appraisal-ineligible deals as a control).  We find consistent 
evidence that the liberalizing 2007 shocks were followed by significant increases in deal premia 
associated with appraisal eligible deals relative to the control group Third, we do a number of tests 
to confirm the robustness of these results.  Specifically, we confirm that are results are not affected 
by: a trend in the difference between appraisal eligible transactions and non-appraisal eligible 
transactions before the event date (i.e., parallel trend violations), alternative plausible event dates 
in 2007, and control for the tax status of the deal. And finally, we show that the 2007 shocks had 
a statistically insignificant effect on the incidence of appraisal-eligible deals relative to the control 
group.  All told, our empirical results suggest that the 2007 reforms (and the appraisal arbitrage 
they ushered in) were beneficial to target shareholder value. 
Our contribution fits into a small but growing literature on appraisal remedies and their 
effects on the takeover market.  As noted above, Choi & Talley (2017) develop a theoretical 
auction model (which we extend here), combining managerial agency costs, shareholder voting, 
and the appraisal remedy to study how and when appraisal contributes to expected shareholder 
welfare.  They find that it does contribute under a variety of plausible conditions, and thus that 
current calls for courts simply to use the “merger price” in appraisal actions should be embraced 
only in special situations (and with considerable caution). Their analysis does not, however, attend 
to the comparative statics we derive and test below.  Mahoney & Weinstein (1999) compare merger 
premia in appraisal-eligible and appraisal-ineligible cases, finding little evidence that appraisal 
eligibility predicts different premia – a finding that is inconsistent with our (but predates many of 
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the dynamics explored here). Jiang, Li, Mei, and Thomas (2016) investigate the appraisal remedy 
and show that appraisal is more likely to be exercised when there is a perception of conflicts-of-
interest and when the premium offered is low, a result that is consistent with our theoretical 
findings.  
Our paper is perhaps most closely related to contemporaneous work by Boone, Broughman 
& Macias (2017) (“BBM”) who also explore the effects of the 2007 shocks (along with other 
smaller events) on appraisal premia.  Their paper generates results that appear fully consistent with 
ours, albeit with a different empirical strategy.  A few differences worthy of highlighting between 
our approach and theirs are as follows: First, our analysis motivates the empirical analysis through 
a theoretical auction-design framework, deriving comparative statics that we then subject to 
testing. BBM’s conceptual approach is more informal / inductive (though they do root some of 
their analysis in the insights from Choi & Talley (2017)). Second, while we use appraisal ineligible 
deals as a control within Delaware-target transactions, BBM treat all Delaware public targets as 
the treatment group and all non-Delaware targets as the control (regardless of appraisal eligibility). 
Relatedly, our approach requires us to confirmed by hand whether the deal qualifies for appraisal 
or not under Delaware law, whereas BBM largely ignores appraisal eligibility.  Fourth, while BBM 
focuses on gross unadjusted premia and abnormal announcement returns, we focus on logged gross 
premia, a design decision we justify in light of the skewed nature of the data. Finally, unlike BBM, 
we conduct robustness checks on our results related to the tax status of a deal, since most appraisal-
eligible deals are taxable (and that taxable deals tend to garner higher deal premia). All that said, 
we view the two papers to be highly complementary and ultimately symbiotic robustness checks 
against one another. 
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Two caveats to our analysis bear emphasis before proceeding. First, the finding that 
appraisal liberalization appears to have enhanced bid premia satisfies an important diagnostic 
condition for the 2007 shocks to have enhanced shareholder welfare as well. Standing alone, 
however, it is not sufficient. For example, if appraisal remedies were already “too generous” (in a 
manner to be formalized below), further liberalization of appraisal could well (i) cause premia to 
increase; but (ii) unambiguously harm incumbent shareholder value by chilling too many deals.  
We address this issue both conceptually and empirically.  Conceptually, we note that the Delaware 
appraisal statute specifically requires courts to focus on going-concern value, excluding synergies 
realized solely from the merger. If courts faithfully discharged this mandate (even approximately), 
we show that an increase in premia induced by liberalization of appraisal rights would then be 
sufficient to conclude shareholder welfare also increased. Empirically, we conduct an additional 
robustness test on whether deal intensity of appraisal-eligible deals declined after the 2007 shocks 
relative to the control group, finding no economically or statistically significant differences—
consistent with modest chilling effects. 
The second caveat relates identification strategy.  By using appraisal ineligible cases as a 
control, we implicitly require that it is difficult for a deal structure to cross the eligibility boundary 
endogenously.  In some cases, that presumption is easily warranted when first order concerns 
dictate deal structure. (For example, a going-private acquisition of a public firm with non-
assignable assets virtually requires that the transaction be eligible for appraisal.)  In contrast, a 
strategic stock-for-stock acquisition by another public company makes it relatively easy to avoid 
appraisal (and most do).  That said, we acknowledge that there can be some slippage between 
eligible and ineligible deals, and that deals that might have weathered the risk of appraisal prior to 
2007 would choose a non-eligible structure afterwards (or vice versa).  Although we conjecture 
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that this slippage would principally act to attenuate our results (thus working in our favor), we 
cannot rule out other potential effects of endogeneity bias either.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section II develops a theoretical model extending the 
analysis of Choi & Talley (2017) to derive comparative statics plausibly associated with the 2007 
shocks. Section III explains how we created our sample and describes our data and variables.  Our 
empirical tests and results are reported in Section IV. Section V briefly concludes. 
 
II.  Model 
This section develops a set of theoretical hypotheses about the plausible effects the 2007 
appraisal liberalization on merger prices and shareholder welfare.  Our analysis builds on the 
appraisal-auction design framework developed elsewhere Choi & Talley (2017). We extend that 
framework here to develop several comparative statics predictions that we take to the data in the 
next section.  Consider a potential sale of a corporate entity (“target”) involving three groups of 
strategic, risk-neutral players:  
• Incumbent target shareholders of the target;  
• An agent (or “manager”) of the firm; and   
• A group of potential buyers.   
 There are four relevant periods (! ∈ {0,1,2,3}) and no time discounting.  At 	! = 0 , 
corporate governance and dissenters’ rights are fixed, and the agent establishes a sale process.  At ! = 1, bidders privately observe their respective valuations of the target and bid on the company 
in pursuant to the established auction protocol.  At ! = 2, incumbent shareholders vote whether to 
accept the winning bid.  Should a sufficient majority vote in favor, the transaction closes, all 
shareholders (including dissenters) relinquish their shares, with assenting shareholders receive pro 
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rata shares of the winning bid as consideration.5  At ! = 3, dissenting shareholders choose between 
(a) accepting the merger consideration, and (b) receiving a judicially determined “fair value” 
through an appraisal proceeding.  We flesh out each of these details below.   
Consider first the target. We assume the target has a single class of fully-distributed voting 
stock, held by a countably large, diffuse group of 2, + 1 incumbent shareholders (with , ∈ ℕ and , ≫ 0), each owning a single share of the company.  For expositional convenience, and following 
Choi & Talley (2017), we invoke the notation of a limiting case where shareholder population 
converges to a continuum with mass 1, each holding a 01 ≈ 34563 fractional ownership share of 
the company.  Each shareholder places a differential valuation on the firm as a going concern, 
indexed through her type 1 ∈ 78, 89 ⊆ [0,∞), representing the shareholder’s willingness to accept.  
Differential willingness to accept among shareholders is common, and may be due to myriad 
factors (such as distinct tax bases, portfolio positions, liquidity preferences, non-convergent 
beliefs, differential time horizons and so forth).  Shareholder type 1  values her fractional 
ownership stake at 1 ∙ 01, and thus implicitly values the entire firm at 1.  Shareholder types are 
distributed according to a commonly-known cumulative distribution function ?(1): [8, 8] →[0,1], with a continuously differentiable density function ℎ(1) > 0 ∀	1 ∈ [8, 8].6 
Shareholders’ differential willingness to accept naturally causes disagreement about the 
relative attractiveness of a takeover bid.  To appreciate the effects of this disagreement in what 
follows, it will help to distinguish between three distinct shareholder types.  First, consider the 
                                               
5 Since—unlike tender offers—dissenters must relinquish their shares, holdouts (a la Grossman & Hart 1980) are not 
as problematic in our model.  We assume a single-step transaction for cash, but both assumptions are easily relaxed. 
6 A special case of this framework involves identically-valuing shareholders, so that 8 = 8 . The assumption of 
differential shareholder valuations is intuitive and familiar. See, e.g., Stulz (1988) (tax basis differences among 
shareholders generating different reservation values); and Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2014) (players holding 
divergent beliefs that are common knowledge but do not converge). 
(next page) 
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marginal shareholder, whose willingness to accept is lowest among all existing shareholders (1 =8) and is thus the most willing to sell.  The marginal shareholder is also functionally the pre-deal 
market price maker, since her value reflects the market clearing asking price for shares in the 
absence of a material prospect of a merger.7  
Second, consider the representative shareholder, which we define as the one whose 
valuation of the firm is equal to the mean across all target shareholders.  Aggregating thusly on [8, 8], the representative / mean shareholder’s willingness to accept is: 
G = H(1) ≡ J 1KK ℎ(1)01 ∈ L8, 8M. (1) 
Note that the value of G is also a focal point for the appraisal remedy, since most appraisal statutes 
(Delaware’s included) direct the court to deliver an assessment calibrated to the target 
shareholders’ overall “going concern” value of the target, one that excludes any additional 
synergies associated with the merger itself. A natural interpretation of this mandate is that fair 
value should be pegged to the representative shareholder’s willingness to accept. (For now, 
however, we will consider a more general case below, where the expected appraisal value is given 
by O > 0, which may or may not be equal to G).8  
Third, let P ∈ (8, 8)  denote the pivotal shareholder, who provides the swing vote in 
approving a merger.  The pivotal shareholder’s identity turns on the threshold mandate needed by 
law / doctrine to approve the merger, which we will denote by the parameter Q ∈ [1 2⁄ , 1).  In 
many cases, the required mandate will map directly onto shareholders’ valuations: conditional on 
                                               
7 This is true since if the market price were higher than any shareholder’s reservation value, that shareholder would 
have sold her shares to the market rather than remaining as a shareholder. 
8 It is important to note that setting appraisal equal to the representative shareholder’s value need not coincide with—
and tends to diverge from—an optimal value for fair market appraisal. While not addressed here, the task of calibrating 
an optimal appraisal value is taken up at length in Choi & Talley (2017). 
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an offered price S, for example, all shareholders with 1 ≤ S would support selling at that price 
while shareholders with 1 > S oppose the sale.  So long as shareholders cast their votes non-
strategically (a condition we interrogate below), obtaining shareholder approval requires offering 
a sufficiently high price S  such that ?(S) ≥ Q .  Consequently, under sincere voting the 
shareholder with valuation P satisfying the condition Q = ?(P) is the unique pivotal shareholder.9  
Our framework allows the approval threshold Q to be set at any level, but it is no doubt most 
natural to highlight the 50% point coinciding with a bare majority and the median shareholder 
(Q = 1/2).10  Shareholder heterogeneity implies that the marginal, representative, and pivotal 
shareholders are generally distinct (except for special distributional cases), and that both the 
representative and pivotal shareholder values lie strictly above that of the marginal shareholders.   
Our model bundles together a variety of individual actors into the “manager” role, 
including not only corporate officers and directors, but also a host of other professionals who work 
with them to design the auction at ! = 0—such as financial and legal advisers. We assume that the 
manager’s key role here is to set a “reserve price” for the auction (WX ≥ 0), which establishes the 
price below which the manager will refuse to sell the company.11 The manager’s behavior may 
stray from shareholders’ interests in two critical respects.  First, manager has limited independent 
ability to commit to a reserve price.  In particular, should bidding prove tepid—so that the highest 
bid falls below the reserve price—the manager cannot credibly commit to walk away from the 
                                               
9 The assumptions on ℎ(. ) guarantee that the relationship mapping from Q and P is unique. That said, as we show 
below, the pivotal voter need not always be unique with insincere voting.  
10 Corporate law typically fixes a default at Q = 0.5. See, e.g., DGCL §251(c). There are exceptions, however. In 
traditional two-step acquisitions (prior to enactment of DGCL § 251(h)), the effective threshold in the first step was 
90% (i.e., Q = 0.9; see DGCL § 253). Also, under Delaware’s anti-takeover statute (DGCL § 203), an “interested” 
stockholder who acquires 15% or more a target’s cannot take control within three years unless it either obtains 85% 
of the outstanding stock at the time of first purchase or it procures a 2/3 vote of disinterested shareholders.  This 
functionally sets Q = min	{0.85, _`ab }, where c ≥ 0.15 denotes the block shareholder’s initial fractional purchase. 
11 There may be other auction-related tasks for the agent, such as recruiting bidders to participate.  We analyze an 
extension below of the case where the agent both sets a reservation price W and expends non-pecuniary effort cost to 
recruit each successive bidder to the table.  We discuss this in the extension section. 
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high bid if it increases her own private payoff relative to the status quo.  Second, irrespective of 
commitment, the manager’s objectives may diverge from those of target shareholders. And, given 
the amalgamated composition of the “manager” player, this divergence can go in multiple 
directions. Consistent with standard agency cost intuitions, the manager may be too reluctant to 
sell the company (such as when she enjoys private benefits of control from the status quo).  
Alternatively, however, the manager may be too eager to sell (such as when she requires liquidity, 
or is unduly influenced by outside advisers angling to close a sale12).  We capture these incentive 
problems by assuming that the manager seeks to maximize the sum of (a) expected aggregate 
shareholder value, and (b) a private payoff of d ∈ ℝ realized in the event of a successful sale.  The 
manager’s objective function is thus given by ΠX = Πg + hW(ijkl) ∙ d, where Πg  denotes the 
expected payoff of shareholders.13  When d > 0, the manager receives a private benefit from sale 
and is thus “too eager” to sell.  When d < 0, by contrast, the manager enjoys a net private benefit 
from the status quo, and is thus “too reluctant.”  In the special case of d = 0, the manager’s 
incentives are perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests.14  We assume that d is commonly 
known by all players. 
Finally, we suppose that n ≥ 1 outside bidders participate in the auction.  We assume n 
to be exogenous at this stage (reserving for an extension the possibility of recruiting bidders).  Each 
                                               
12 See, e.g., RBC Capital Markets v. Jervis (“Rural-Metro”) (2015) (financial advisor manipulated board into accepting 
a proposed deal for which it had buy-side financing prospects); Smith v. Van Gorkom (1985) (retiring CEO sold the 
target too cheaply and with inadequate diligence).   
13 To avoid circularity, we omit from Πg any components of shareholder payoff due to appraisal remedies. At the cost 
of additional notation, this framework can easily be generalized to ΠX = o ∙ Πg + hW(ijkl) ∙ d where o ∈ (0,1).  
Qualitative results of the paper will not change. 
14 Although it is often intuitive to assume managers categorically have net private benefits of control under the status 
quo (so that d < 0), the opposite can easily hold in our framework too.  For example, a variety of golden-parachute 
can skew directors’ and officers’ incentives towards sale.  More significantly, because our definition of “manager” 
amalgamates the interests of officers, directors, financial advisers, legal advisers, providers of finance, etc. under a 
single banner, a pro-sale skew becomes particularly unsurprising. In any event, we demonstrate below that 
commitment constraints alone can generate our main result, even when the manager enjoys moderate private benefits 
of control under the status quo. 
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bidder p ∈ {1,… , n} costlessly observes its private valuation of the target, denoted by 8r . We 
consider an independent private values (IPV) auction, where 8r is independently and identically 
distributed on support [0,∞) according to a commonly-known cumulative distribution function s(8), with continuously differentiable density function of t(8) > 0 ∀8 ∈ [0,∞).  We also make 
a standard regularity assumption that the hazard rate 3uv(K)w(K)  is monotone non-increasing in 8.   
Because this is an extensive form game with privately informed players (the buyers and 
the shareholders), Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is an appropriate solution concept, and we 
employ it throughout in what follows (calling it simply an “equilibrium”). The equilibrium and the 
optimal strategies for a generic auction of this type are well known in the literature: for each buyer, 
the dominant strategy is to stay in the auction until the bid surpasses his valuation 8r .15  The 
probability of a sale for n ≥ 1 number of bidders and reserve price W ≥ 0, therefore, is given by Pr{zjkl|n, W} = 1 − s(W)}.  An issue animating much of our discussion concerns the “optimal” 
reserve price W∗ ∈ [8, 8], which we define as that which maximizes the shareholders’ expected 
payoff.  A well-known result from the literature on generic IPV auctions is that when the seller’s 
valuation is equal to G,	the optimal reserve price is independent of n and is given by:  
W∗ = G + 1 − s(W∗)t(W∗)  (2) 
 
Note that W∗ ∈ (G, 8), so that shareholders would optimally set a reserve price exceeding their 
average valuation.16  If shareholders could choose (and commit to) their own reserve price, then W∗ would be a logical choice. 
                                               
15 See Myerson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Ausubel and Cramton (2004). 
16 The condition above is closely related to the monopoly pricing problem, where the seller sets price by balancing the 
chance of no sale against the hope of a higher winning bid (Bulow and Klemperer (1996)). 
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 However, at least three factors cause this framework to deviate from the standard auction 
model, and most of them are functionally related to reserve pricing. First, the requirement of a 
shareholder vote to approve a deal tends to provide an implicit floor to bidding, at a level that is 
closely related to the pivotal voter’s willingness to accept (1 = P).  Bids that fail to exceed this 
threshold generally are not approved in equilibrium (assuming one refines the set of equilibria to 
“weakly undominated” voting outcomes17).   
Second, the appraisal remedy itself may also provide pricing pressure akin to a reserve 
price by providing dissenters with an outside option to seek appraised value (at O, as discussed 
above) rather than accepting the winning bid. The attractiveness of that option turns on its relative 
value to other parameters and the ease of seeking appraisal.   
Finally, target management can play a role in setting a reserve price directly in bargaining, 
the nature of which turns on the manager’s credibility and incentives.  As to credibility, we suppose 
that the manager cannot credibly refuse to approve any winning bid that will—if accepted—cause 
the manager’s expected payoff to increase above the status quo, and thus she may not be able to 
hold out for an aggressive reserve without some external constraint (see above).  Consequently, 
garnering managerial agreement to the terms of the merger (subject to the manager’s limited ability 
to commit) implies that the agent will privately hold out for a reserve price of:  WX∗ ≡ jc{G −d, 0} (3) 
It is easily confirmed that so long as the manager does not derive benefits that are “too large” from 
the status quo (d > −3uv(Ä∗)w(Ä∗) ), the manager’s reserve price	falls short of the optimal reserve (WX∗ <W∗). And, whenever the managerial team receives a net benefit from a sale relative to the status quo 
                                               
17 This refinement disallows any posited equilibrium strategy ÅÇÉ for any player 1 if there exists an alternative strategy ÅÑÉ ≠ ÅÇÉ that fares at least as well for player 1 across every possible permutation of opponents’ strategy profiles ÜuÉ ∈áuÉ, and does strictly better for player 1 in at least one such permutation. See Choi & Talley (2017) for details. 
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(d ≥ 0), the manager’s reserve price is even less aggressive than the going-concern value of the 
firm (as reflected by the representative shareholder’s value of G). 
 Choi and Talley (2017) characterize the equilibria of a target auction conducted in the 
shadow of (i) shareholder voting, (ii) dissenters’ appraisal rights, and (iii) management’s optimal 
renegotiation-proof bargaining strategy. These equilibria can deviate from a standard auction set 
up in several ways – but in particular, bidding need not coincide with truthful revelation (even in 
an ascending / Vickrey auction).  Rather, the equilibrium in this case depends on the relative values 
of the governance and valuation parameters, in a way encapsulated by the following result: 
Proposition 1.  The following constitute the pure strategy equilibria of the target auction given 
pivotal shareholder type P, a managerial reserve price WX∗ , and an expected appraisal value O: 
 
(A) When O < jc{WX∗ , P}, all weakly undominated equilibria are revenue equivalent to that 
of an ascending auction with a reserve price equal to Ŵ = jc{WX∗ , P}.  Bidders drop out 
when the prevailing bid equals their private valuations (8r). The winning bid is always at 
least jc{WX∗ , P} and is approved without dissent. No shareholders seek appraisal. 
 
(B) When O ≥ jc{WX∗ , P}, there are two classes of weakly undominated equilibria: 
 
(1) In the first, all equilibria are revenue equivalent to an ascending auction with a reserve 
price equal to Ŵ = O. Bidders drop out when the prevailing bid equals their private 
valuations (8r). The winning bid is always at least O and is approved without dissent. 
No shareholders seek appraisal. 
 
(2) In the second, all equilibria are revenue equivalent to an auction with reserve price 
equal to jc{QP + (1 − Q)O, WX∗ }. Bidders drop out before the prevailing bid reaches 
their private valuations (8r ). If the winning bid exceeds O, it is approved without 
dissent and no shareholders seek appraisal.  Otherwise, the winning bid is approved 
by a bare Q-fraction of target shareholders, and the remaining (1 − Q) seek appraisal.   
 
Proof: See Choi & Talley (2017) (Proposition 6).18 
 
                                               
18 For purposes of this paper, we confine our analysis to pure strategy equilibria. We note, however, that Choi & 
Talley (2017) also demonstrate that when shareholder types are truly differentiated across shareholders, mixed 
strategy equilibria generally do not exist.  
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The gravamen of Proposition 1 is that the outside threat of appraisal (with expected value 
of O) “matters” for bidding outcomes only if it is not eclipsed by alternative forms of price 
protection, namely shareholder voting (through P) and credible managerial bargaining (through WX∗ ).  When O < jc{WX∗ , P} (Part 1A of the Proposition), the appraisal option is insufficiently 
potent to move the pricing needle, since management’s threat point and/or the required vote on the 
deal already ensure that no winning below the larger of WX∗  and P can pass through the sluice gates. 
The bid-disciplining effect of appraisal is thus overshadowed by other factors, and incremental 
“shocks” to appraisal’s availability have no effect on prices or shareholder welfare. 
When the anticipated appraisal award exceeds the alternative sources of price protection, 
however (so that O ≥ jc{WX∗ , P}), equilibrium behavior changes significantly. In particular, two 
types of pre-strategy equilibria emerge. In the first “non-coordinated” equilibrium (Part 1B(1)), 
shareholders’ are unable to coordinate their actions, so that all will vote against the transaction 
unless the winning bid is at least O, causing O to become the effective reserve price for the auction.  
In the second “coordinated” equilibrium (Part 1B(2)), shareholders coordinate their voting 
behavior:  Those seeking appraisal must rely on sufficiently many affirmative voters to approve 
the deal and make appraisal possible, and all shareholders voting to approve the merger effectively 
become pivotal.  Consequently, bidders expect to pay a two-part price consisting of the winning 
bid’s “announcement” price (paid to all shareholders) and an additional appraisal supplement (to 
the 1 − Q fraction of shareholders who oppose the deal).  This expectation, in turn, induces bidders 
to drop out before the going bid reaches their private valuations, since they must capitalize the 
value of the anticipated supplement through appraisal.  Consequently, in this equilibrium, the 
winning bid reflects a type of “hold back” of some of the consideration in order to satisfy appraisal 
claimants. The end result of this strategic posturing is that the coordinated equilibrium replicates 
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the aggregate expected revenues of an ascending auction with de facto reserve price equal to jc{QP + (1 − Q)O, WX∗ }, though such revenues are no longer split pro rata between dissenting 
shareholders and supporters of the deal. 
 Choi and Talley (2017) also demonstrate that so long as the alternative sources of reserve 
pricing fall short of the revenue-maximizing reserve price for the auction—so that jc{WX∗ , P} <W∗— there always exists a binding shareholder-welfare maximizing appraisal value that is unique 
conditional on the equilibrium that emerges.  (See Choi & Talley 2017, Proposition 7). When the 
uncoordinated equilibrium obtains, this optimal appraisal value is simply W∗ ≡ G + 3uv(Ä∗)w(Ä∗) , the 
familiar optimal reserve price in an independent values auction.  When the coordinated equilibrium 
obtains, in contrast—where the winning bid “holds back” some of his payment for future appraisal 
actions—the optimal appraisal value is even larger, and is equal to W∗∗ ≡ âÄ∗uäã3uä å > W∗. Though 
seemingly counter-intuitive, this result makes sense since the optimal reserve price must set a floor 
for the buyer’s total expected payment for the target; and thus, when bidders rationally shave their 
nominal bids downward, an optimal appraisal policy compensates by pushing the appraisal 
component of total consideration even higher. 
 Our central focus in this paper concerns not the design of an “optimal” appraisal rule per 
se. Rather we seek to generate testable predictions about how a “shock” to appraisal policy 
plausibly distorts deal pricing, and what implications such distortions hold for shareholder welfare. 
Note further that in light of the possibility of distributionally non-neutral equilibria (as in the 
“coordinated” equilibria in Proposition 1(b)(2)), one might be interested in two potential vantage 
points for measuring shareholder value: (1) Aggregate expected shareholder value, which simply 
integrates over the distribution of payoffs among shareholders without regard to distribution; or 
(2) “Maximin” shareholder value, which focuses on the expected payoffs realized by those 
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shareholders who receive the lowest payoff from a sale (the “have-nots” in the coordinated 
equilibrium above).  We will keep track of both measures of welfare in the discussion below. 
Several corollaries to Proposition 1 follow immediately from analysis and comparative statics 
associated with the equilibria of the auction game.  We list four of them formally below19: 
Corollary 1:  When O < jc{WX∗ , P} , the expected announcement price and all measures of 
expected shareholder welfare are invariant in O. 
 
Corollary 2:  When jc{WX∗ , P} ≤ O  and the non-coordinated equilibrium emerges, expected 
announcement price and all measures of expected shareholder welfare are strictly increasing in O so long as O ≤ W∗. If O > W∗, however, expected announcement price is strictly increasing in O, 
but all measures of expected shareholder welfare are strictly decreasing in O. 
 
Corollary 3:  When jc{WX∗ , P} ≤ O  and the coordinated equilibrium emerges, expected 
announcement price may be increasing or decreasing in	O. When O ≤ W∗∗, the maximin measure 
of expected shareholder welfare is strictly increasing in O if and only if expected acquisition price 
is also increasing; the aggregate measure of expected shareholder welfare is weakly increasing if 
and only if O ≤ W∗∗. When O > W∗∗, aggregate shareholder value is weakly decreasing in O and 
maximin shareholder value is increasing only if announcement price is also increasing.  
  
The most intuitive way understand how Corollaries 1-3 fit together is through a graphical 
representation per Figure 1. The left panel of the Figure depicts the comparative statics of the 
model within the “non-coordinated” equilibrium, while the right panel does the same for the 
“coordinated” equilibrium. In each panel, the vertical axis depicts the expected appraisal value 
(O ), while the horizontal axis depicts jc{WX∗ , P}  -- effectively the maximal reserve price 
stemming from managerial bargaining combined with shareholder voting.  Note from both figures 
that in the lower right triangular region (where O < jc{WX∗ , P}), appraisal has no equilibrium 
effect on behavior; consequently, expected pricing and shareholder welfare are invariant to 
changes in O.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
                                               
19 The proofs of all Corollaries are provided in the Appendix.  
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In the upper left triangular region (where O ≥ jc{WX∗ , P}), changes in O generally do 
affect both pricing and target shareholder welfare—but not always in a uniform way.  In the non-
coordinated equilibrium (left panel), expected acquisition prices always increase as O increases; a 
result that is unsurprising given that this equilibrium is the functional equivalent to a second-price 
auction with reserve price of O.  However, expected shareholder welfare is not monotonic in O, 
and it is increasing only so long as O < W∗.   In the coordinated equilibrium (right panel), several 
other factors may be in play, depending on the ordering of WX∗  and P. What is clear, however, is 
that so long as O ≤ W∗∗, increasing O  always weakly improves aggregate shareholder welfare 
(even if its effect on price is ambiguous).  Once O > W∗∗, however, the reverse is true, and expected 
target shareholder welfare weakly decreases in O,  with indeterminate effects on equilibrium 
pricing. A somewhat more complicated picture characterizes the maximin measure of shareholder 
welfare, since it is possible that an increase in appraisal rights may confer benefits on the “haves” 
in this equilibrium while making the “have nots” worse off.  What is clear is that a necessary 
condition for increasing the welfare of the have-nots is if expected announcement price also 
increases upon an upward shock to O.  
The heterogeneous comparative statics contained in Corollaries 1-3 and Figure 1 present a 
complication to our empirical design for purposes of extracting a “clean” comparative static robust 
across all equilibria.  However, if one consolidates the observations made above, then one clean 
prediction does emerge from the analysis above, at least when one constrains the appraisal rights 
under the status quo such that O ≤ W∗. Combining Corollaries 1 through 3, we have the following 
central Corollary:  
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Corollary 4:  So long as O ≤ W∗, both measures of expected shareholder welfare are increasing in O if expected announcement price is also increasing in O. 
 
 
Corollary 4 relates shareholder welfare to a readily testable comparative static on O (so long as 
one can be sufficiently confident that its underlying assumption holds).  If we see acquisition prices 
in appraisal-eligible deals increase after an upward shock O, it signifies that shareholder welfare 
must be increasing as well.   
 But what of Corollary 4’s predicate assumption that O ≤ W∗? How assuredly does this 
hold? Recall from the analysis above that W∗ ≡ G + 3uv(Ä∗)w(Ä∗)  represents the familiar, revenue-
maximizing reserve in a private-values auction.  Is there any reason to believe that, prior to the 
2007 shocks, courts arrived at fair value appraisals strictly less than this amount?  We contend that 
there is a good reason to believe so: The statute itself. Recall that DGCL § 262 requires the court 
to peg appraisal value equal to the going-concern value of the firm under the status quo ante, 
without any buyer-side synergies. In our framework, this value is equal to G by construction, and 
it is clear that G = W∗ − 3uv(Ä∗)w(Ä∗) < W∗. Thus, so long as courts tend—in expectation—to comply 
even approximately with their statutory mandate under appraisal law, then the condition for 
Corollary 4 must hold.  More formally, so long as expected appraisal values under the status quo 
are within the approximate “neighborhood” of the representative shareholder’s going-concern 
value (or if O ≈ G), then a finding that deal premia increase in O is equivalent to shareholder 
welfare also increasing.   
  
The intuitions contained in Corollaries 1-4 are directly relevant to the next section, which 
studies two important and roughly contemporaneous upward shocks to fair value appraisals.  
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1. August 2007: Amendment of § 262(h) of the DGCL.  Under the amendment, 
Delaware code began granting presumptive pre-judgment interest in all appraisal 
actions pegged (absent an override by the Court) a quarterly compounded quarterly 
rate of the Federal Reserve discount rate plus 5%. (DGCL § 262(h); Effective 
August 2007).  While pegged to another section of the Delaware code on pre- and 
post-judgment interest, most commentators agree that this statutory reform 
effectively decoupled and made less risky the prejudgment interest return, creating 
nearly instantaneous arbitrage rents. 
 
2. May 2007: In Re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. In Transkaryotic, 
Chancellor Chandler held that a beneficial owner of stock who buys after the 
record date of merger may still assert appraisal right for those newly purchased 
shares, and need not prove how such shares were actually voted pursuant to the 
direction of the prior beneficial owner. The impact of this opinion was significant, 
since it made it much easier for hedge funds to engage in appraisal arbitrage, 
purchasing a large number of target shares after announcement for their appraisal 
value—effectively allowing the arbitrageur to spread the costs of appraisal 
litigation across the shares purchased. 
 
 The combined effects of the amendment to DGCL § 262 and Transkaryotic are both fairly 
interpretable as an upward “shock” to anticipated fair value appraisal (or O in our model). Consider 
first the effect of the statutory interest reform, under which successful claimants would now be 
able to earn a return on the financial value of their claims that typically exceeded the risk-adjusted 
returns in the market for similar investments.  Effectively, the pre-judgment interest statute gave 
petitioners a statutory return Wg  that exceeded the risk adjusted return in the underlying 
target/acquirer, H(Wç), compounded over “T” quarters (where T is usually between 8 and 12 
quarters).  Thus, the present value of the of a gross appraisal claim of O was shocked upwards by 
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the statutory interest change effectively inducing a post-interest claim of O′ = O ∙ â 36Äè36ê(Äë)å5 >O, effectively representing an upward shock to O. 
 The Transkaryotic case can be interpreted as visiting a subtler—but conceptually 
analogous—upward shock in O, this time due to the economies of scale in aggregating appraisal 
claims through market trading.  To see this point, consider a slight extension to our framework in 
which the net benefit of appraisal value to petitioner is equal to O − í (where c proxies for the 
petitioner’s litigation costs). Here, a stockholder’s aggregate holding (01) plays an important role 
in whether she will seek appraisal, since their benefit of appraisal over accepting the bid price b is (O − S) ∙ 01 and their cost is í; without claims trading, the only litigants who would seek appraisal 
are those for whom 01 > ìîuï	, which would rarely (if ever) happen when the shares are widely 
held (so that 01 is small).  After Transkaryotic, however, claims trading could potentially place 
all the appraisal shares in the hands of a single party, who exists so long as there is a SH valuing 
more than the largest bid price.  Absent an appraisal-out or supermajority provision, then, appraisal 
could be aggregated across the entire fraction (1 − Q) of dissenters, who stand to gain up to (O −S) ∙ (1 − Q) through the action. The now-aggregated shareholder will seek appraisal whenever (1 − Q) > ìîuï	 . By effectively introducing scale economies in appraisal, Transkaryotic 
functionally induced an upward shock in the “net-per-share” value of O within the baseline model. 
 Together, then, it is fair to conclude that the 2007 reforms visited a combined upward shock 
on O within our model, allowing us to perform a direct empirical test of Corollary 4’s condition 





III. Sample Creation and Data Description  
 
3.1. Sample Creation 
To construct our sample, we begin by collecting data on all domestic merger deals from 
Thompson Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) database.  We select all completed deals with 
effective dates between January 2003 and December 2016, resulting in 19,547 observations. We 
then only include deals with publicly traded targets that are incorporated in the state of Delaware.  
Furthermore, consistent with Hsieh and Walkling (2005) and Jiang, Li, Mei, and Thomas (2016), 
we exclude all deals classified as recapitalizations, repurchases, spinoffs, and divestures, as they 
are not generally considered as merger activity and would not be eligible in any circumstances for 
appraisal rights. Finally, we drop all duplicate observations, and observations missing deal 
premium data from the SDC database.  Our final sample consists of 2,083 unique deals.  
 
3.2 Definition and Sources of Variables  
 Our principal dependent variable of interest is gross deal premiums (gross_prem), defined 
as the bid price bid price divided by the target’s closing stock price one week prior to deal 
announcement. The top panel of Figure 2 shows that deal premiums are highly skewed. 
Accordingly, we winsorize the variable at the 1% and 99% level, and—as in Roll (1988) and Dari-
Mattiacci and Talley (2016)—take the natural logarithm of the gross premium (ln	(óWòii_öWl)).  
We call this variable ln(gross_prem). The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that the right-tail 
skewness is visibly reduced. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 The SDC database also provides us with deal characteristic information such as 
announcement date, effective date, deal size, and form of consideration (percentage of payment to 
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target shareholders in stock, cash, other and/or unknown).  SDC additionally provides data on 
target and acquirer firm characteristics at the time of the merger such as total assets, total debt, net 
income, and industry SIC codes.  The three target firm control variables we use are: ln(Assets), 
which is the natural logarithm of the target firm’s total assets as of the date of the most current 
financial statement prior to deal announcement; Leverage, which is the target firm’s book value of 
debt divided by total assets; and ROA, the ratio of the target firm’s most recent 12-month net 
income divided by its total assets.  All three variables are taken from the target firm’s most recent 
financial statement prior to the date of the merger announcement.  In addition, we define a dummy 
variable, Private, which is set to unity if SDC has flagged the deal as a “going private” transaction, 
and zero otherwise. 
In order to control for industry effects, we use the SIC codes to construct ten industry 
dummy variables according to the Fama-French industry classifications.  We also create a dummy 
variable for related deals: If both the target and acquiring firm are in the same industry and share 
the same SIC code we set the variable related to unity, and set it to zero otherwise. 
  We supplement our observations with economic data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED) to include information on interest rates, unemployment, GDP growth, and 
inflation at the time of each merger deal.  We create an opportunity cost variable, op_cost, that is 
defined as the difference between the high quality corporate bond yield and the federal funds rate 
during the month of each observation. The monthly federal funds rate, not seasonally adjusted, is 
used to construct the variable Fed_funds.  Quarterly GDP growth from the quarter one-year ago, 
seasonally adjusted, is used for the variable GDP.  Monthly civilian unemployment rates and urban 
consumer price index growth rates are used to construct UNEMP and CPI, respectively.  Finally, 
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the daily CBOE Volatility Index value is used to construct VIX. A summary of the variables used 
is listed in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.3 Determination of Appraisal Eligibility 
 To determine whether a deal is eligible for appraisal we start by analyzing the form of 
consideration data from SDC.  Because the DGCL 262(b) restores appraisal rights for deals that 
require target shareholders to accept cash consideration, we exclude all deals involving a 100% 
stock consideration from our treatment group.  (We tested a random sample of 100 deals that SDC 
has labeled as “100% stock” by checking their merger agreements to verify that SDC’s 
classification is accurate; all were classified correctly.) 
 Due to the existence of some ‘exceptions-to-the-cash’ rules in Delaware law concerning 
cash payments and the fact that SDC classifications of “unknown” and “other” are too vague to 
determine appraisal eligibility, we manually examined merger agreements and 8-K filings from 
the SEC EDGAR database for all remaining (i.e., non-100% stock) deals. The first exception-to-
the-cash rule is the occurrence of an apparently all-stock deal which offers the payment of a special 
dividend immediately prior to the merger that is contingent on shareholder approval.  The 
Delaware Chancery Court deemed that shareholders in such cases are entitled to appraisal rights.20 
SDC includes these special cash dividends as “other” in combination with a portion of the 
consideration classified as “stock.”  These cases were identified and included in the treatment 
group.  The second exception-to-the-cash rule occurs when shareholders are given the option to 
                                               
20 Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Crawford (2007) 
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elect whether they receive a cash or stock consideration.  In such cases, the Chancery Court has 
ruled that appraisal rights are not available to target shareholders, as appraisal rights are only 
awarded when accepting cash consideration is mandatory.21  To account for these cases, merger 
agreement forms for all deals classified by SDC as having any portion of consideration paid in 
cash were manually collected and examined for appraisal rights terms and conditions. The above 
procedure results in 1,465 appraisal-eligible deals out of our total sample of 2,083 unique deals.  
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 We begin by examining the descriptive statistics of our variables in Table 2.  We observe 
that the average deal premium for our full sample is a 34% increase in the bid price over the target 
firm’s stock price one-week prior to deal announcement.  In Panel B, we separate our observations 
into two subsections according to whether the deal terms allow for appraisal rights or not.  We 
observe that those deals that are eligible for appraisal rights on average have slightly higher deal 
premiums (35%) than those deals that are not appraisal eligible (24%).  Furthermore, appraisal 
eligible deals tend to have targets with lower levels of debt (23.7%, compared with 50.5% for non-
eligible deals).  Not surprisingly, appraisal-eligible deals also had a higher probability of being a 
“going private” deals, with about 32% of the sample deals being classified as going private, 
compared with only 8% of the non-eligible sample.  Deals where the target and acquiring firm are 
both in the same industry also had a slightly greater incidence of appraisal-eligible deals than in 
non-eligible deals, with 45% and 31% of deals, respectively, occurring between firms in related 
industries. 
[Insert Table 2] 
                                               
21 Krieger v. Wesco Financial Corp. (2011) 
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 In Panel C, we investigate shifting trends in our variables over time by dividing our data 
observations into three time periods: the period prior to the Transkaryotic opinion (January 1, 2003 
to May 1, 2007); the time between Transkaryotic and the effective date of the prejudgment interest 
amendment (May 2, 2007 to July 31, 2007); and after the pre-judgement interest amendment 
(August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2016).  We observe that bid premiums increased to an average 
of 32% after the pre-judgment compared to an average premium of 28% before the Transkaryotic 
court ruling.  In addition, there was a slightly larger representation of “going private” transactions 
before Transkaryotic (21% of deals) versus after the pre-judgement statute (19%).  The proportion 
of deals between firms in related industries increased from 38% before the Transkaryotic ruling to 
41% after the pre-judgement statute. 
 
IV. Empirical Tests and Results 
4.1 Effect of Appraisal Eligibility on Bid Premiums 
 In Table 3 we present the results of our regression analysis of the effects of appraisal 
eligibility on shareholder wealth.  We consider all 2,083 observations over the entire period of our 
study (2003-2016). Our dependent variable, ln(gross_prem), is regressed over ten different 
specifications to evaluate the significance of our variable of interest, Appr. Eligible. In column [1], 
we use a simple OLS regression of the appraisal eligibility dummy on log gross premiums, without 
any control variables.  Columns [2] and [3] include a set of control variables for deal characteristics 
and macroeconomic effects, respectively.  Deal characteristic controls include Target ROA, Target 
Leverage, and dummies for Going Private, and Related.   Macroeconomic controls include our 
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measure of opportunity cost, op_cost, as well as the quarterly Fed Funds rate, GDP growth, 
unemployment rate, inflation rate, and the 30-day market’s expectations of S&P 500 volatility. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
In columns [4] through [6] we include industry dummy variables based on the ten Fama-
French industry classifications to control for industry fixed-effects.  Columns [7] and [8] include 
quarterly dummies to control for time fixed-effects and columns [9] and [10] include both industry 
and quarterly fixed-effects.  Specifications that include both quarterly fixed-effects dummies and 
macroeconomic variables were excluded due to the collinearity of the two sets of controls.   
 Across all specifications, we find our variable of interest, Appr. Eligible, is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This provides strong evidence that a deal being eligible for appraisal 
predicts higher premia for target shareholders, with average one-week deal premiums increasing 
anywhere between 11.4%-14.4%22, depending on which specification we consider.  We interpret 
our results to provide evidence that appraisal rights petitions are not nuisance suits, but instead 
offer a benefit to all target shareholders. It is consistent with the notion that the credible threat of 
appraisal litigation may be deterrent effect for an acquiring firm to increase its bid, therefore 
benefiting all target shareholders, and not just those filing the lawsuits. (Although other factors 
contribute to this premium as well—such as the greater likelihood that taxable deals are appraisal 
eligible—we show below that this premium is not fully explained by the taxability of the deal.) 
  
  
                                               
22 Marginal effects of the Appr. Eligible coefficients are derived from the regression coefficients by using the functional 
transformation lõ − 1.  The reported range is taken from the lowest and highest coefficient values of the Appr. Eligible 
variable reported in Table 3. 
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4.2 Effects of the 2007 Shocks on Deal Premiums 
 We turn next to an analysis of the effect that the 2007 “shocks” to appraisal had on merger 
deal premiums.  As noted by Korsmo and Myers (2014), the Transkaryotic opinion is broadly 
thought to have catalyzed a surge in appraisal petition activity and created a large change in the 
use of appraisal in Delaware. In addition, appraisal arbitrage incentives were further fed by an 
amendment to the Delaware appraisal statute regarding pre-judgement interest rates that occurred 
six days after the Transkaryotic opinion was released. As noted above, under this proposed 
amendment (which became effective August 1, 2007), appraisal petitioners would be 
presumptively entitled to prejudgment interest pegged at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount 
rate, compounded quarterly, up to the date of the judgment.  Due to the potential combined shock 
of the two events, we deem the (excluded) “event window” to be the period between Transkaryotic 
(May 2, 2007) and the effective date of the statutory amendment (August 1, 2007).  We use a 
difference-in-differences model to test the effect of this event.  We restrict our sample of 
observations to three years before and three years after our event date, (though all results hold 
when we use a time period of two years before and after the event window as well). 
We estimate the following difference-in-differences model: kú(1 + hWlpùr) = t(ûr; Qr) + o† ∗ °ööW	HkpópSklr + o3 ∗ hòi!êK¢£§ r 																																																																		+o4 ∗ °ööW	HkpópSklr × hòi!_H8lú!r + ¶r  (4) 
    where: 
 
f(Zi) = set of control variables Zi and estimated coefficients 
Post_Eventi = 1 ó Date of announcement is after excluded event window 
Appr. Eligiblei = 1 ó Transaction was eligible for appraisal rights  
 
 We define our treatment group as all deals that are appraisal eligible and the control group 
as all deals that are not appraisal eligible.  Our set of control variables and ten different model 
specifications remain consistent with the previous section and Table 3. As noted above, we use the 
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log of one-week gross deals premiums as our dependent variable, and pay interest to the o4 
coefficient, which identifies the differential effect of appraisal rights on merger premiums after the 
2007 shocks. 
 Table 4 reports the results of our difference-in-differences model.  We find across all ten 
model specifications a significantly positive effect on our treatment group after the event date.  
This suggests that 2007 shocks had the effect of increasing bid premiums for those deals eligible 
for appraisal rights, above that of our control sample.  Depending on the specification, the 
economic impact of the 2007 shocks to a range of 9.7%-17.2% increase in gross premiums for 
appraisal eligible deals. 23  
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Additionally, in all of the models that included deal characteristic controls (columns [2], 
[3], [5], [6], [8], and [10]), Target ROA is associated with a higher deal premium.  Target firm size, 
as measured by total assets, also has a statistically significant in four of the six specifications that 
it is included in (columns [2], [3], [5], and [8]).  Our results indicate that target size is negatively 
associated with deal premiums. 
The positive significance of deal premiums for appraisal-eligible deals after the 2007 
shocks indicates a beneficial effect that the increase in appraisal activity has had for all target 
shareholders.  Recall from Corollary 4 above that so long as the status quo appraisal value is below 
the optimal reserve price (as the appraisal statute seems to require), shareholder welfare improves 
if and only if acquisition prices also increase after the shock. The results above demonstrate the 
latter, facilitating a fair inference of the former. We thus interpret the results to be consistent with 
                                               
23 In unreported regressions (available from authors), we include several other notable post-2007 cases as candidate 
shocks (such as the Ancestry.com and Huff v. CKx opinions, finding no economically or statistically notable effects. 
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the argument that appraisal arbitrage opportunities after the 2007 shocks have had an overall effect 
of inducing higher bid premiums and higher overall target shareholder value. Consistent with our 
model, this effect would beneficial for all target shareholders, not just the petitioners of these 
lawsuits (notwithstanding the possibility that petitioners gained even more). 
 
4.3 Effects of the 2007 Shocks on Takeover Rates 
Our findings that deal premiums increased after the 2007 shocks catalyzed appraisal 
arbitrage is fully consistent with our model’s prediction of enhanced shareholder value.  However, 
we reiterate that the inference on shareholder welfare requires an assumption that appraisal 
valuations tend to comply with the statutory mandate of awarding going concern value (or in G our 
model).  While we believe this to be a reasonable assumption, one might further interrogate it by 
investigating whether the 2007 shocks had a measurable chilling impact on takeover rates in 
appraisal-eligible deals. That is, the inference that shareholder welfare also improves (along with 
deal premia) might appear questionable if the 2007 reforms caused acquiring firms to shift 
dramatically away from deal terms and conditions that allow for appraisal rights. 
 To investigate this question, we run two regression models for deal completion rates.  
Results are reported in Table 5.  First, we run a negative binomial regression model to determine 
the effect of the 2007 shocks on the number of appraisal eligible deals.  The dependent variable, 
eligibledeals, is a count of the number of merger deals completed per quarter that had appraisal 
rights available to shareholders. The post-Event coefficient is insignificant, indicating that the 
court decisions had no significant impact on deal terms that would shift towards a decrease in the 
availability of appraisal rights.  Next, we run a Tobit regression to determine the effect of the court 
decisions on the proportion of appraisal eligible deals to total deals available per quarter.  The 
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post-Event coefficient is again insignificant, indicating that the court decision had no significant 
impact on the structuring of deal terms that allow for appraisal rights petitions.   
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
In summary, the above results show that appraisal eligible deals earn higher deal premiums 
than non-appraisal eligible deals and this difference increases after the 2007 shocks. We also find 
no statistically meaningful impact of appraisal eligibility and the 2007 shocks on takeover rates. 
In the next section, we examine the robustness of the deal premium results.  
 
4.4 Robustness Tests 
4.4.1 Parallel Trend Assumption: The first robustness check examines the key identifying 
assumption of the difference-in-differences design—that the treatment group and the control group 
both follow parallel trends prior to the event date and that there was no indication of any systematic 
pre-trend during the time leading up to the Transkaryotic decision. That is to say, that in the 
absence of the Transkaryotic case ruling, any difference in merger bid premiums would remain 
similar between appraisal eligible deals and non-eligible deals over time.   
 Figure 3 illustrates a leads and lags plot of the difference in bid premia for appraisal eligible 
deals versus non-eligible deals for the eight quarters before and after our event date (where the 
event date is the period between the 5/2/2007 Transkaryotic ruling and the 8/1/2007 interest 
amendment declaration).  The regression coefficient of interest is of the Appr. Eligible indicator 
variable, wherein ln(gross_prem) is regressed on Appr. Eligible and firm and deal characteristics. 
Each regression coefficient and its error band at the 95% confidence interval is plotted for the 
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sixteen quarters around the event date.  A fitted line of the eight regression coefficients before the 
event date, and the fitted line of the eight regression coefficients after the event date, is used to 
illustrate any trends.  Prior to the event date there a slight downward trend (if any significant trend 
at all) in higher deal premiums for appraisal eligible deals as the coefficients approach the event 
date.  After the event date, however, we observe a noticeable increasing trend in appraisal eligible 
deal premiums over those for non-eligible deals.  
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Figure 4 shows a parallel trends plot of the average ln(gross_prem), sorted into treatment 
and control groups for 12 quarters before and after the event date. Residuals are from the OLS 
model predicting ln(gross_prem) with control variables for economic, industry, deal, and firm 
characteristics. As visible from the plot, trends in bid premiums over time for our treatment and 
control groups have no apparent trend prior to the event date.  It is not until after the event that we 
observe that our treatment group shifts towards higher bid premiums when compared to the control 
group. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Following the methodology of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Bishop, Jackson, and Mitts 
(2017), we perform a “balance test” using regressions to test whether there was any significant 
pre-trend between our control and treatment groups in the two years before the Transkaryotic 
ruling.24  We use the following specification: 
                                               
24 This methodology was also used by Bishop, R. E. (2017). Activist Directors and Information Leakage (Doctoral 
dissertation, Columbia Law School). 
 35 
 kú(1 + hWlpùr) = o† ∗ °ööW. HkpópSklr + o3 ∗ ßr,§ + o4 ∗ (°ööW. HkpópSklr × ßr,§) + ¶r,§   (5) 
where °ööW. HkpópSklr is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a deal is appraisal eligible; ßr,§ is the 
number of quarters before the Transkaryotic ruling; and ¶r,§  is a random error term.  The 
difference-in-differences coefficient of interest is o4 , which indicates the difference in the 
quarterly time trend between the treatment and control groups after the 2007 reforms.  Results are 
shown in Table 6. We find that o4 is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that there was 
no significant systematic pre-trend between the two groups before the event dates. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
4.4.3 Change in Event Dates: Tables 7 and 8 provide additional robustness tests to show that our 
decision to use the time window between the Transkaryotic ruling and the interest pre-judgement 
is appropriate.  We run our difference-in-differences model as we did in Section 4.2 adjusting our 
event date to different specifications.  Table 7 provides results from using only the May 2, 2007 
Transkaryotic case ruling as the event date.  The sample includes all observations three years 
before and three years after the court ruling.  Our variable of interest, the interaction variable After 
TT * Appr. Eligible, remains statistically significant across all specifications, with the exceptions 
of columns [5] and [6] in which case statistical significance decreases from the 1% level to the 5% 
level.  Table 8 provides results for when only the August 1, 2007 interest payment pre-judgement 
amendment date is used.  Results remain significant across all specifications, and all coefficients 
of interest remain in the range of the results obtained from the original event date specification. 




4.4.4 Tax Considerations: To make sure that the increase in merger premiums is not traceable to 
tax considerations when cash is the medium of exchange in the transaction, we manually code the 
tax status of each deal under prevailing IRS rules. Table 9 provides results of our regression 
analysis of the effects of appraisal eligibility on shareholder wealth when only non-taxable deals 
are considered.  In the table, we reduce our sample to only deals that are classified as non-taxable 
by the Delaware corporate law code.  This reduces our sample size to 203 non-taxable deals over 
the entire sample period of 2003-2016. Our dependent variable, ln(GrossPrem), still shows a 
significant increase in deal premiums in the range of 6.6%-9.4% for appraisal eligible deals above 
those premiums for deals not eligible for appraisal rights.  These results are consistent when we 
apply the full models with our control variables and economic controls, as well as our full model 
with control variables and quarterly fixed effects.  
[Insert Table 9] 
 
V. Conclusion  
 This paper has developed, analyzed, and tested an auction-design framework in the mergers 
and acquisitions context to explore the plausible effects of a significant liberalization in 
shareholder appraisal remedies that occurred in 2007.  We have found, consistent with our model’s 
predictions, that the credible threat of appraisal can act as an effective “reserve price” in a target 
company auction, and that the 2007 liberalization of appraisal appears to have moved this de facto 
reserve price higher.  Our results, which appear to be robust and are contemporaneously 
corroborated consistent results from others in the field (e.g., Boone et al 2017), suggest that the 
reserve-price rationale for appraisal actions appears to be substantial. Moreover, we although we 
cannot test directly for shareholder welfare effects of the 2007 shocks, both the nature of the 
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appraisal statute and the insignificant effects on deal activity appear strongly consistent with the 
claim that the reforms also enhanced target-company welfare.  It is notable, therefore, that recent 
judicial opinions in Delaware have acted substantially to undercut the credible threat (and risk) of 
post-merger appraisal. Future work would do well to revisit the current jurisprudential moment, 
treating it as representing an appraisal-winnowing shock, and inquiring whether the shock is 
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Proofs of Corollaries 
 
Corollary 1:  When O < jc{WX∗ , P}, the expected acquisition price and all measures of expected 
shareholder welfare are invariant in O. 
 
Proof: Suppose O < jc{WX∗ , P}. By construction, for any successful bid, it must be the case that  S ≥ WX∗ , or the directors will not allow a shareholder vote.  Similarly, for any successful bid it must 
also be the case that S ≥ P, or the shareholders would (under the weak dominance assumption) 
reject the bid.  Consequently, it must be the case that for all winning bids, S > O.  Conditional on 
a positive vote, then, no shareholder would seek appraisal since it would strictly reduce her 
expected payoff.  Now consider an infinitesimal local shock 0O  to expected appraisal value, 
increasing O to O© = (O + 0O).  Because it remains true that S > O′, appraisal remains irrelevant 
and equilibrium bids and approval decisions remain the same. Consequently, shareholder welfare 
does not change either.¢ 
 
 
Corollary 2:  When jc{WX∗ , P} ≤ O  and the non-coordinated equilibrium emerges, expected 
acquisition price and all measures of expected shareholder welfare are strictly increasing in O so 
long as O ≤ W∗. If O > W∗, however, expected acquisition price is strictly increasing in O, but all 
measures of expected shareholder welfare are strictly decreasing in O. 
 
Proof: Assume O ≥ jc{WX∗ , P}  and that O < W∗ . In the uncoordinated equilibrium, O  is the 
sharpest lower bound on acceptable bids, and thus is isomorphic to a reserve price for the auction, 
and thus all shareholders seek appraisal unless S ≥ O.  Only buyers with valuations exceeding O 
will enter the auction, and thus, conditional on sale, the expected winning bid is given by H7max	{O, 8(}u3)}|8(}) ≥ O9 , where 8(})  and 8(}u3)  represent the first and second order 
statistics (respectively) of the population of n buyers. Characterizing this value requires using a 
variety of identities in order statistics. It is straightforward to confirm that the maximum order 
statistic, 8(}), has cumulative distribution s(})(8) = s(8)}, with associated density function of t(})(8) = nt(8)s(8)}u3. The second-highest order statistic, 8(}u3), has cumulative distribution s(}u3)(8) = n ∙ s(8)}u3L1 − s(8)M. Moreover, conditional on 8(}) = c, then the remaining (N-
1) values remain conditionally independent but bounded above by c, so that each has a conditional 
distribution function of v(K)v(¨)≠ . The distribution of 8(}u3)  conditional on 8(}) ≥ O  is therefore 
(after some simplification): 
 s(}u3)L8|8(}) ≥ OM = s(}u3)(8) ∙ [ln	(s(O)u})] (A1) 
 
Under the uncoordinated equilibrium, the winning bid (if there is one) is equal to  max	{O, 8(4)|8(3) ≥ O}, and thus in expectation the winning bid is (after simplification): 
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where recall that s(}u3)(8) is the unconditional cumulative distribution function on the second-
highest valuation among the N bidders.  The term on the outside of the square brackets is clearly 
increasing in O, and differentiating the term inside the brackets respect to O yields: 
 s(}u3)(O) + O ∙ t(}u3)(O) − O ∙ t(}u3)(O) = s(}u3)(O) > 0 (A3) 
 
Thus, the expected price is always strictly increasing within the uncoordinated equilibrium. As to 
expected shareholder welfare, note first that in the uncoordinated equilibrium all shareholders 
receive the same price. Finally, note that by construction of W∗, shareholders’ expected payoff is 
strictly increasing in O for all O < W∗ and strictly decreasing for all O > W∗ (See Choi and Talley 
2017 for details).¢ 
 
Corollary 3:  When jc{WX∗ , P} ≤ O  and the coordinated equilibrium emerges, expected 
acquisition price may be increasing or decreasing in	O. When O ≤ W∗∗, the maximin measure of 
expected shareholder welfare is strictly increasing in O if and only if expected acquisition price is 
also increasing; the aggregate measure of expected shareholder welfare is weakly increasing. 
When O > W∗∗, aggregate shareholder value is weakly decreasing in O and maximin shareholder 
value is increasing only if announcement price is also increasing. 
 
Proof: Now consider the coordinated equilibrium which occurs only when the following condition 
is satisfied at winning bid b: max	{WX∗ 	, P} < S < O. Let us first assume that WX∗ ≤ P, so that WX∗  
plays no role in the auction (as P is a sharper bound).  Within this setting, a successful bid b will 
pay a “headline” price of b to a fraction Q of shareholders and will pay the expected appraisal price O to the remaining shareholders (who vote against and seek appraisal).  Consequently, the winning 
bidder will expect to pay a price of: QS + (1 − Q)O.  An incentive compatible, efficient auction 
can be implemented through a revelation mechanism in which each bidder reports its type and the 
highest report wins, paying a headline “announcement” price equal to b, where:  
 S(8(4)) = ± P pt		8(4) < QP + (1 − Q)O≤≥LK(a)u(3uä)îM pt	8(4) ∈ [QP + (1 − Q)O, O]8(4) pt	8(4) > O  (A4) 
 
Factoring in appraisal seekers, of course, the “aggregate” price paid by the winning bidder will be: 




Thus, the expected announcement price will be given by: 
 
 
 HµS(8(4))∂ = J Pî∑K 0s(}u3)L8|8(}) ≥ O¥M +J âKuî∑ä + På∏∑π≥∫(≤π≥)î∑ 0s(}u3)L8|8(}) ≥ O¥M 	+ J 8K∏∑π≥∫(≤π≥) 0s(}u3)L8|8(}) ≥ O¥M (A6) 
 
Where we have utilized the substitution O¥ ≡ QP + (1 − Q)O so that O = ∏∑π≥∫(≤π≥) . Note that O¥  is 
strictly increasing in O, so we can do qualitative comparative statics on O by doing comparative 
statics on O¥ .  Differentiating the above. Substituting for s(}u3)L8|8(}) ≥ O¥M, this expression 
becomes: 
 µS(8(4))∂ = 7ln	(s(O¥)u})9
∙ ªPs(}u3)LO¥M + J âKuî∑ä + På∏∑π≥∫(≤π≥)î∑ 0s(}u3)(8) 	+ J 8K∏∑π≥∫(≤π≥) 0s(}u3)(8)º (A7) 
 
Without additional assumptions, it is not possible to sign unambiguously the derivative of the 
expected announcement price as a function of O.  Because the maximin welfare of shareholders 
increases if and only if the announcement price increases, the ambiguity follows here as well. As 
to aggregated shareholder welfare, however, we know that so long as O < W∗∗, shareholder welfare 
is strictly increasing in O, and strictly decreasing thereafter. 
 Now suppose that WX∗ ∈ (P,O] so that the manager sets a higher reserve payoff than the 
pivotal shareholder.  There are two relevant cases: (a) WX∗ ∈ (P, QP + (1 − Q)O], and (b) WX∗ ∈(QP + (1 − Q)O,O] . In case (a), the manager’s reserve price is still not binding, since the 
minimally acceptable bid under appraisal is the winner’s total costs, which can never be lower than QP + (1 − Q)O under this equilibrium. Here, then, the same equilibrium as above holds.  In case 
(b), the manager has additional slack to achieve his reserve price and will (credibly) announce a 
reserve price ŴX∗  so that the total consideration paid achieves WX∗ . Thus, the manager will set 
 WX∗ = QŴX∗ + (1 − Q)O	 ⟺ ŴX∗ = 3ä(WX∗ − (1 − Q)O	) (A8) 
 
Here, when O  increases, the manager will simply reduce her announcement reserve price to 
compensate, so that the aggregate reserve price remains as a mean-preserving spread.  It is easily 
confirmed here that aggregate shareholder welfare does not change, but both price and maximin 
shareholder welfare decrease because of the slackened announcement reserve. This establishes that 





Corollary 4:  So long as O ≤ W∗, expected shareholder welfare is increasing in O if expected 
announcement price is also increasing in O. 
 
Proof: Within the connected components of the coordinated and non-coordinated equilibria, the 
claim in the Corollary follows directly from Corollaries 1-3 and Figure 1.  One last consideration, 
however, concerns what happens when a shock to O causes the equilibrium to “jump” from one 
class to the other.   
 
Suppose first that there is a jump from the non-coordinated equilibrium to the coordinated one as O is increased by infinitesimal 0O, and consider the case where WX∗ ≤ QP + (1 − Q)O.  In this 
case, the announcement price immediately falls from to H7púµP, ≤≥L8(4) − (1 − Q)OM∂9 < O <O + 0O, and the auction migrates from one with a de facto reserve price of O to one with a de 
facto reserve price of QP + (1 − Q)O. Consequently, because O ≤ W∗ we also know that expected 
aggregate revenue declines as well.  Finally, in the coordinated equilibrium, the have-not 
shareholders must be worse off than under the status quo ante, since now they receive the lower, 
non-pro-rata share of a winning bid in an auction whose de facto reserve is further away from 
optimal than it was initially. The case where WX∗ > QP + (1 − Q)O  under the coordinated 
equilibrium differs only in the respect that the manager may set a reserve higher than P and reduce 
it to with the shock to O in order to preserve an Q-weighted mean spread.  Prices still decline, as 
does maximin welfare, though aggregate shareholder welfare remains unchanged. 
 
The identical reasoning (in reverse) applies when the shock to O  induces a jump from the 
coordinated equilibrium to the non-coordinated one.  So long as O ≤ W∗, such a jump will result 
in both an upward price shock and an upward jump in both measures of shareholder welfare. This 
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Figure 3: Leads and Lags: This Figure plots pre- and post-time trends bid premia for the treatment and 
control groups. The x-axis is the number of quarters between the Transkaryotic/interest pre-judgement court 
rulings. Coefficients are from the Appraisal Eligible indicator variable on the OLS model on ln(1wkprem) 
including deal/firm characteristic and industry control variables. 95% confidence intervals of the 



















Figure 4: Parallel Trends: This Figure plots pre- and post-time trends for the residuals of bid premia 
for the treatment and control groups. The x-axis is the number of quarters between the 
Transkaryotic/interest pre-judgement court rulings. We average the log premia by treatment and control 
group for each quarter. The treatment group, appraisal eligible deals, is plotted in blue, while the control 





















Table 1:  Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable Description [Source] 
ln(Gross_prem) Natural logarithm of one plus the premium of offer price to target closing stock 
price one-week prior to the original announcement date. [SDC] 
 
ln(assets) Natural logarithm of the target firm’s total assets as of the date of the most current 
financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). [SDC] 
 
Leverage Target’s book value of debt as of the date of the most current financial information 
available prior to the announcement of the transaction) divided by target’s total 
assets. [SDC] 
ROA  
Ratio of the target firm’s most recent 12-month net income divided by its total 
assets. [SDC] 
 
Private Dummy variable set to unity if the merger is a going private deal, and zero 
otherwise. [SDC] 
 
Related Indicator if the target firm and the acquirer firm are in the same industry.  Dummy 
variable set to unity if both firms share the same 3-digit SIC code, and zero 
otherwise. [SDC] 
 
Op_cost 10-year high quality corporate bond par yield (AAA, AA, & A rated), monthly, not 
seasonally adjusted minus the effective federal funds rate, monthly, not seasonally 
adjusted. [FRED] 
 
Fed_funds Effective federal funds rate, monthly, not seasonally adjusted. [FRED] 
 
GDP Growth in real gross domestic product, % change from quarter one-year ago, 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted. [FRED] 
 






consumer price index for all urban consumers: all items, index 1982-1984=100, 
monthly, seasonally adjusted. [FRED] 
 
The daily CBOE Volatility Index measurement of the market’s expectation of 30-



















Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variable Mean Median s.d. 
Gross_prem 0.336 0.257 0.428 
ln(Gross_prem) 0.247 0.228 0.289 
ln(assets) 5.939 5.907 2.368 
Leverage 0.377 0.204 1.674 
ROA -0.314 0.001 2.51 
Private 0.188 0 0.391 
Related 0.375 0 0.484 
     
Panel B: Appraisal Eligibility                               
 Appraisal Eligible Non-Appraisal Eligible 
Variable Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d. 
Gross_prem 0.348 0.298 0.418 0.237 0.147 0.432 
ln(Gross_prem) 0.288 0.261 0.265 0.161 0.137 0.317 
ln(assets) 5.918 5.82 1.885 5.957 6.008 2.739 
Leverage 0.237 0.135 0.371 0.505 0.282 2.286 
ROA -0.092 0.016 0.885 -0.517 -0.028 3.362 
Private 0.319 0 0.466 0.078 0 0.268 
Related 0.452 0 0.498 0.311 0 0.463 
 
Panel C: Three Time Periods   
 
Before Transkaryotic 
(05/02/04 - 05/01/07) 
Between TT and Pre-judgment 
(05/02/07 - 07/31/07) 
After Pre-judgement 
(08/01/07 - 08/01/10) 
Variable Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d. Mean Median s.d. 
Gross_prem 0.278 0.230 0.337 0.228 0.230 0.212 0.319 0.240 0.471 
ln(Gross_prem) 0.214 0.207 0.247 0.192 0.206 0.161 0.221 0.215 0.334 
ln(assets) 5.584 5.522 2.187 6.000 5.973 2.568 6.469 6.601 1.976 
Leverage 0.280 0.177 0.145 0.446 0.203 2.349 0.369 0.263 0.525 
ROA -0.161 0.007 0.653 -0.467 0.000 3.523 -0.176 -0.006 0.389 
Private 0.205 0 0.404 0.177 0 0.382 0.186 0 0.389 
Related 0.382 0 0.486 0.359 0 0.48 0.408 0 0.492 
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Table 3: Prediction of Appraisal Eligibility on Bid Premiums.  In this table, we provide the results of ten ordinary least squares models 
in which the dependent variable is Ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium.  The regression includes all 
deals from the full time range of our sample, 1/1/2003-12/31/2016.  The coefficient of interest is the variable Appr. Eligible, which captures the difference 
in premiums of those deals which are eligible for appraisal rights from those in our control sample.  Columns [4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for 
industry fixed effects using the ten SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications.  We use robust standard errors and the t-statistics are in parentheses.   
We follow the following indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p< 0.05, and * indicates p< 0.10. 
 
y = ln(gross_prem) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
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-0.003           
(-0.52) 
 




-0.018             
(-1.07) 
-0.017                
(-1.00) 
 
-0.010          
(-0.59) 
-0.009           
(-0.54) 
 
-0.016            
(-0.97) 
 




0.011          
(0.85) 
0.011           
(0.83) 
 
-0.001           
(-0.08) 
-0.001           
(-0.08) 
 
0.011             
(0.86) 
 




-0.037***      
(-3.43) 
  
-0.038***         
(-3.52) 
    
Fed_funds 
  
-0.032***      
(-3.49) 
  
-0.033***          
(-3.60) 
    
GDP 
  
-0.007            
(-1.19) 
  
-0.007           
(-1.21) 
    
UNEMP 
  
-0.001            
(-0.10) 
  
0.0001         
(0.02) 






-0.0001           
(-0.13) 
0.003**          
(2.10) 
  
-0.0002          
(-0.32) 
.003**      
(2.09) 





0.445**     
(2.72) 
0.133***        
(8.74) 
0.211***       
(6.74) 
0.415***    
(2.58) 
0.150***   
(3.21) 
0.296***         
(3.95) 
0.131***      
(2.67) 
0.252***    
(3.35) 
Quarterly dummies  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
n 2,083 2,037 2,037 2,083 2,037 2,037 2,083 2,037 2,083 2,037 
Adjusted !" 0.0424 0.0678 0.0815 0.0651 0.0837 0.0974 0.0816 0.1053 0.1013 0.1197 
p-value that industry effects=0 
   
0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 
  
0.0000*** 0.0003*** 
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Table 4: Difference-in-Differences (three years before TT, three years after pre-judgment). In this table, we provide the results of ten 
ordinary least squares models in which the dependent variable is ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium.  The 
regressions include all deals from the 3 years before the Transkaryotic court ruling (5/2/2007) and the 3 years following the pre-judgement interest ruling (8/1/2007).  
The coefficient of interest is the variable After Interest * Appr. Eligible, which captures the effect in the post-event treatment group from those in our control 
sample.  Columns [4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for industry fixed effects using the ten SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications.  We use robust 
standard errors and the t-statistics are in parentheses.   We follow the following indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p< 0.05, 
and * indicates p< 0.10. 
 
y = ln(gross_prem)    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 




0.071***     
(2.72) 
0.058**         
(2.26) 
0.063**      
(2.50) 
0.058**        
(2.03) 
0.062**             
(2.39) 
0.067***       
(2.66) 
0.055**     
(2.17) 
0.060**      
(2.42) 
Post_Event -0.057           
(-1.66) 
-0.041          
(-1.26) 
-0.136**         
(-2.56) 
-0.050           
(-1.48) 
-0.036           
(-1.14) 
-0.082                
(-1.40) 
    
Post_Event * Appr. Eligible 0.121***   
(3.03) 
0.105***        
(2.69) 
0.113***     
(2.73) 
0.106***         
(2.67) 
0.093**      
(2.45) 
0.159**         
(2.47) 
0.132***      
(3.19) 
0.116***         
(2.90) 
0.117***      
(2.84) 




-0.018***     
(-3.61) 
-0.016***       
(-3.27) 
 
-0.012**       
(-2.32) 
-0.009            
(-1.34) 
 
-0.016***        
(-3.20) 
 




0.021**         
(2.03) 
0.020**      
(2.10) 
 
0.025***    
(2.58) 
0.024***      
(2.62) 
 
0.021**     
(2.38) 
 




0.002            
(0.54) 
0.002         
(0.54) 
 
0.002       
(0.81) 
0.003        
(1.03) 
 
0.001     
(0.20) 
 




-0.002             
(-0.09) 
0.000       
(0.00) 
 
0.012            
(0.49) 
0.022         
(0.78) 
 
0.005       
(0.23) 
 




0.035*          
(1.86) 
0.034*       
(1.86) 
 
0.024       
(1.24) 
0.038        
(1.38) 
 
0.034        
(1.79) 
 




-0.029          
(-1.31) 
  
-0.012             
(-0.23) 
    
Fed_funds 
  
-0.036          
(-1.20) 
  
-0.001          
(-0.02) 
    
GDP 
  
-0.009           
(-0.98) 
  
-0.023*           
(-1.75) 
    
UNEMP 
  
-0.009           
(-0.51) 
  
0.025           
(0.81) 






-0.005          
(1.64) 
0.001        
(0.47) 
  
-0.003           
(-0.55) 
-0.005          
(-0.81) 





-0.424           
(-0.91) 
0.134***     
(5.14) 
0.191***       
(4.23) 
0.907           
(0.91) 
0.165***     
(2.61) 
0.254***      
(3.62) 
0.142**        
(2.23) 
0.197***      
(2.64) 
Quarterly dummies  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
n 987 971 971 987 971 971 987 971 987 971 
Adjusted !" 0.054 0.087 0.096 0.077 0.103 0.111 0.085 0.113 0.104 0.128 
p-value that industry effects=0 
   
0.002*** 0.0305** 0.067* 
  
0.005*** 0.048** 
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Table 5: Appraisal Eligible Deal Count.  In column [1] of this table, we provide the results a 
negative binomial model in which the dependent variable is the number of appraisal eligible deals 
completed per quarter. .  Column [2] provides the results a tobit regression model in which the dependent 
variable is the number of appraisal eligible deals completed divided by the total number of deals completed 
per quarter.  The regression includes merger deals from 1/1/2003-12/31/2016.  The coefficient of interest is 
the variable Post_TT, which captures the effect of the Transkayotic court ruling on the total number of 
deals (proportion of deals) eligible for appraisal rights.  We use robust standard errors.  T-statistics are 
provided below correlation coefficients in parenthesis.   We follow the following indicators of statistical 










































y = appraisal eligible deal 
count per quarter 
[2] 
y = proportion of appraisal 
eligible deals to total deals 
per quarter 







Constant 2.689***                                
(22.59) 
0.488***                                     
(23.22) 
Obs 
Adjusted !" 56 0.0574 56 0.0149 
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Table 6:  Robustness Test 1 -- Balance Test (Parallel Trends Analysis) 
 
 
2 years prior to Transkaryotic   
Ln(GrossPrem) coeff. t-stat. 
Appr. Eligible 0.0712 1.31 
TTqtr  -0.0008 -0.09 
TTqtr * Appr. Eligible 0.0038 0.34 










Table 7: Robustness Test 2 -- Change of Event Date to Transkaryotic Ruling. In this table, we provide the results of ten ordinary least squares 
models in which the dependent variable is ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium.  The regressions include all deals 
from the 3 years before and after the Transkaryotic court ruling (5/2/2007).  The coefficient of interest is the variable After TT * Appr. Eligible, which captures the 
effect in the post-event treatment group from those in our control sample.  Columns [4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for industry fixed effects using the ten 
SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications.  We use robust standard errors and the t-statistics are in parentheses.  We follow the following indicators of 
statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p< 0.05, and * indicates p< 0.10. 
y = ln(gross_prem)    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
 
Appr. Eligible 0.069**             
(2.51) 
0.074***   
(2.71) 
0.072***     
(2.74) 
0.060**         
(2.28) 
0.066**      
(2.50) 
0.064**        
(2.52) 
0.064**             
(2.44) 
0.069***       
(2.67) 
0.056**     
(2.16) 
0.060**      
(2.37) 
 
After TT -0.059         
(-1.59) 
-0.045           
(-1.26) 
-0.130***       
(-2.69) 
-0.054           
(-1.50) 
-0.041          
(-1.20) 
-0.121**         
(-2.54) 
     
After TT * Appr. Eligible 0.104**   
(2.47) 
0.090**        
(2.17) 
0.093**     
(2.28) 
0.091**         
(2.20) 
0.079**      
(1.97) 
0.083**         
(2.09) 
0.119***      
(2.86) 
0.107***         
(2.65) 
0.106***      
(2.58) 





-0.018***     
(-3.34) 
-0.016***        
(-3.27) 
 
-0.012**       
(-2.07) 
-0.010**            
(-2.00) 
 
-0.016***        
(-2.88) 
 





0.021**    
(1.97) 
0.021**      
(2.05) 
 
0.026***    
(2.66) 
0.025***      
(2.73) 
 
0.021**     
(2.43) 
 





0.002         
(0.47) 
0.001         
(0.44) 
 
0.002       
(0.81) 
0.002        
(0.79) 
 
0.001     
(0.19) 
 





-0.002            
(-0.08) 
-0.001           
(-0.06) 
 
0.012            
(0.48) 
0.011         
(0.45) 
 
0.003       
(0.12) 
 





0.028       
(1.48) 
0.027       
(1.49) 
 
0.019       
(0.96) 
0.018        
(0.99) 
 
0.027        
(1.38) 
 





-0.037            
(-1.32) 
  
-0.029             
(-1.29) 
     
Fed_funds 
  
-0.035            
(-1.25) 
  
-0.032            
(-1.11) 
     
GDP 
  
-0.008           
(-0.73) 
  
-0.007           
(-0.59) 
     
UNEMP 
  
-0.009           
(-0.46) 
  
-0.003            
(-0.15) 






0.005*            
(1.87) 
0.001         
(0.39) 
  
0.005*           
(1.67) 
0.001        
(0.46) 
     
Constant 0.166***     
(6.86) 
0.254***      
(5.89) 
-0.360           
(-1.06) 
0.131***     
(4.83) 
0.187***       
(3.86) 
-0.507           
(-1.09) 
0.176***     
(3.23) 
0.211***      
(4.76) 
0.141**         
(2.35) 
0.139***      
(2.73) 
 
Quarterly dummies  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
 
n 1,012 996 996 1,012 996 996 1,012 996 1,012 996 
 
Adjusted !" 0.045 0.073 0.083 0.068 0.090 0.084 0.079 0.101 0.099 0.118  
p-value that industry 
effects=0 
   














Table 8: Robustness Test 2 -- Change of Event Date to Interest Pre-judgment. In this table, we provide the results of ten ordinary least squares 
models in which the dependent variable is ln(gross_prem), which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium.  The regressions include all deals 
from the 3 years before and after the pre-judgement interest ruling (8/1/2007). The coefficient of interest is the variable After Interest * Appr. Eligible, which 
captures the effect in the post-event treatment group from those in our control sample.  Columns [4], [5], [6], [9], and [10] all control for industry fixed effects 
using the ten SIC-based Fama-French industry classifications.  We use robust standard errors and the t-statistics are given in parentheses. We follow the following 




y = ln(gross_prem)    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 




0.061**     
(2.30) 
0.052*         
(1.90) 
0.057**      
(2.10) 
0.054**        
(2.10) 
0.067***             
(2.61) 
0.073***       
(2.78) 
0.060**     
(2.31) 
0.064**      
(2.48) 
After Interest Amendment -0.077**        
(-2.01) 
-0.063*          
(-1.67) 
-0.114**       
(-2.30) 
-0.071*       
(-1.88) 
-0.058        
(-1.59) 
-0.109**         
(-2.24) 
    
After Interest * Appr. 
Eligible 
0.142***   
(3.24) 
0.127***        
(2.95) 
0.122***     
(2.95) 
0.128***         
(2.94) 
0.115***      
(2.72) 
0.110***         
(2.71) 
0.129***      
(3.21) 
0.118***         
(3.02) 
0.118***      
(2.98) 




-0.018***     
(-3.33) 
-0.016***        
(-3.26) 
 
-0.012**       
(-2.06) 
-0.010*            
(-1.93) 
 
-0.017***        
(-2.88) 
 




0.022**         
(2.35) 
0.021**      
(2.25) 
 
0.027***    
(3.31) 
0.026***      
(3.16) 
 
0.022***     
(2.77) 
 




0.002            
(0.71) 
0.002         
(0.59) 
 
0.003       
(1.18) 
0.003        
(1.04) 
 
0.001     
(0.32) 
 




-0.001             
(-0.05) 
0.001       
(0.07) 
 
0.015            
(0.60) 
0.015         
(0.65) 
 
0.001       
(0.04) 
 




0.022          
(1.57) 
0.032*       
(1.71) 
 
0.019       
(0.92) 
0.020        
(1.06) 
 
0.029        
(1.42) 
 




-0.026            
(-1.13) 
  
-0.026             
(-1.16) 
    
Fed_funds 
  
-0.032            
(-1.10) 
  
-0.029            
(-0.98) 
    
GDP 
  
-0.006           
(-0.74) 
  
-0.006           
(-0.67) 
    
UNEMP 
  
-0.005       
(-0.32) 
  
-0.001        
(-0.04) 






0.003            
(1.16) 
0.001            
(0.34) 
  
0.003           
(1.11) 
0.001          
(0.42) 





-0.168        
(-0.37) 
0.135***     
(4.62) 
0.193***       
(3.82) 
-0.249        
(-0.55) 
0.161     
(2.54) 
0.254***      
(3.53) 
0.134**        
(2.06) 
0.186      
(2.41) 
Quarterly dummies  No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
n 996 981 981 996 981 981 996 981 996 981 
Adjusted !" 0.054 0.084 0.093 0.079 0.103 0.114 0.084 0.109 0.108 0.129 
p-value that industry 
effects=0 
   
0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
  
0.000*** 0.002*** 
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Table 9: Tax-Free Deals Only -- Effect of Appraisal Eligibility on Bid Premiums.   
In this table, we two ordinary least squares models in which the dependent variable is Ln(gross_prem), 
which is the natural logarithm of the one-week merger deal premium.  The regression includes tax-free  
deals from 1/1/2003-12/31/2016.  The coefficient of interest is the variable Appr. Eligible, which captures 
the effect in the post-event treatment group from those in our control sample We use robust standard errors 
and the t-statistics are in parentheses.  We follow the following indicators of statistical significance: ***  
indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p< 0.05, and * indicates p< 0.10. 
 
 
y = ln(gross_prem) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 












-0.032***     
(-2.78) 
-0.026***     
(-3.06) 
 




-0.208***         
(-3.82) 







0.021            
(0.33) 
0.011              
(0.18) 
 




-0.062            
(-0.52) 
-0.064                
(-0.54) 
 




0.008          
(0.24) 
0.007           
(0.20) 
 



























-0.001           
(-0.62) 







0.765     
(1.35) 
0.305***   
(8.64) 
0.498**         
(2.48) 
Quarterly dummies  No No No Yes Yes 
n 203 198 198 203 198 
Adjusted !" 0.029 0.144 0.196 0.367 0.456 
p-value that macro effects=0 
  
0.149 
  
